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Abstract	  
This	  paper	  invites	  readers	  to	  look	  into	  how	  beliefs	  about	  future	  events	  help	  to	  better	  understand	  
organizational	  change.	  Our	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  information	  technology	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  
new	  organizational	  forms	  around	  it	  have	  been	  driven	  by	  shifts	  in	  collective	  ideas	  of	  legitimate	  
organizational	  development.	  As	  an	  example	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  establishment	  during	  the	  1960s	  of	  a	  vision	  
within	  US	  retail	  financial	  services,	  namely	  of	  the	  “cashless/checkless	  society”.	  The	  article	  tells	  of	  the	  
power	  of	  this	  “imaginaire”	  to	  bring	  consensus	  in	  driving	  actual	  technological	  developments.	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“Why	  are	  the	  lines	  at	  automatic	  cash	  dispensers	  (so	  much	  for	  the	  paperless	  society)	  	  




History	  is	  the	  study	  of	  the	  past;	  of	  events	  that	  have	  already	  taken	  place.	  Notably	  in	  this	  journal	  and	  sister	  
outlets,	  we	  have	  emphasized	  the	  study	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  business	  organizations	  to	  better	  understand	  
the	  development	  of	  capitalism.2	  In	  contrast,	  most	  people	  care	  primarily	  about	  the	  future.	  After	  giving	  a	  
historical	  talk	  to	  a	  general	  audience	  we	  are	  used	  to	  being	  asked	  only	  what	  this	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  future.	  
We	  tend	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  answer	  with	  tangible	  predictions	  knowing	  from	  our	  workaday	  immersion	  in	  
the	  materials	  of	  the	  past	  that	  predictions	  are	  almost	  invariably	  wrong.	  So	  historians	  leave	  the	  future	  to	  
others.	  But	  this	  places	  us	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  because,	  as	  we	  will	  
argue	  in	  this	  article,	  explaining	  the	  adoption	  of	  technology	  and	  particularly	  information	  technology,	  is	  
based	  on	  imagined	  futures	  as	  much	  as	  tangible	  innovation.	  
Our	  argument	  is	  not,	  we	  hasten	  to	  add,	  that	  history	  will	  somehow	  let	  us	  produce	  better	  and	  more	  
reliable	  predictions	  of	  future	  events.	  Rather	  we	  believe	  that	  shared	  visions	  of	  historical	  inevitability	  were	  
often	  a	  crucial	  and	  neglected	  factor	  in	  shaping	  the	  thoughts	  and	  actions	  of	  our	  historical	  actors.	  The	  
development	  of	  careers,	  organizations,	  institutional	  fields,	  and	  technologies	  were	  shaped	  not	  just	  by	  
perceptions	  of	  current	  conditions	  but	  by	  belief	  in	  particular	  future	  events,	  of	  desirable	  things	  to	  come.	  
From	  the	  1950s	  onward	  technology	  companies,	  experts,	  consultants,	  and	  business	  professors	  have	  sold	  
new	  technologies	  to	  business	  by	  presenting	  elaborate	  visions	  of	  a	  future	  world	  transformed	  by	  universal	  
adoption	  of	  technology.	  Acceptance	  of	  these	  visions	  took	  place	  not	  just	  individually	  but	  also	  collectively,	  
by	   industries	   and	   occupations.	   When	   technologies	   failed	   to	   perform	   as	   expected	   this	   could	   be	  
characterized	   as	   a	   bump	   in	   the	   road	   to	   the	   future,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	   inevitability	   of	  
eventually	  arriving	  at	  the	  agreed	  destination.	  Once	  consensus	  on	  the	  future	  destination	  was	  reached	  a	  
variety	  of	  specific	  systems	  or	  approaches	  could	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  realizing	  this	  future	  goal,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Edward	  Tenner	  (1996)	  Why	  things	  bite	  back	  	  (London:	  Fourth	  Estate):	  5.	  
2	  Louis	  Galambos,	  "The	  Emerging	  Organizational	  Synthesis	  in	  Modern	  American	  History",	  Business	  History	  Review	  
44,	  no.	  3	  (Autumn	  1970):	  279-­‐290;	  Christopher	  Kobrak	  and	  Andrea	  Schneider	  (2011)	  “Varieties	  of	  business	  
history”,	  Business	  History,	  53(3):	  401-­‐424.	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making	   the	   future	  a	  banner	  around	  which	  a	  heterogeneous	  alliance	  of	   interests	   could	  gather.	  This,	  of	  
course,	  would	  further	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  the	  vision	  itself.	  The	  argument	  for	  business	  adoption	  of	  
future	  technology	  has	  generally	  been	  made	  in	  the	  future	  tense.	  
We	  ground	  this	  suggestion	  within	  the	  “New	  Institutionalism”	   literature	  on	  organizational	  analysis.	   In	  a	  
seminal	  article	  Paul	  J.	  DiMaggio	  and	  Walter	  M	  Powell	  explored	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  organizations	  in	  a	  
particular	  field	  tend	  to	  grow	  more	  and	  more	  alike,	  which	  they	  dubbed	  “institutional	  isomorphism.”	  This,	  
they	  argued,	  reflected	  not	   just	  a	  set	  of	   independent	  and	  rational	  competitive	  responses	  to	  a	  changing	  
environment	   but	   also	   a	   cultural	   process	   by	   which	   a	   consensus	   on	   the	   appropriate	   and	   legitimate	  
institutional	   form	  evolved	  within	   a	   particular	   field.	   They	   identified	   three	  mechanisms	   for	   this	   change:	  
coercive	   (for	   example	   from	   standards	   and	   regulations),	   mimetic	   (copying	   the	   reactions	   of	   peer	  
institutions	   to	   environmental	   uncertainty),	   and	   normative	   (stemming,	   they	   believed,	   primarily	   from	  
professionalization).3	  We	  suggest	  that	  mimetic	   isomorphism	  can	  function	  not	   just	  through	  copying	  the	  
innovations	   of	   other	   organizations	   but	   by	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   shared	   vision	   of	   historical	   inevitability	  
within	   an	   organizational	   field.	   Normative	   isomorphism	   is	   driven	   by	   the	   agendas	   of	   professional	   and	  
occupational	  groups,	  which	  in	  turn	  often	  reflect	  acceptance	  within	  a	  professional	  community	  of	  a	  shared	  
vision	  of	  the	  future.	  	  
The	  case	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  future	  to	  historical	  decision-­‐making	  can	  also	  be	  made	  from	  a	  number	  
of	  other	  perspectives.	  Future	  expectations	  are	  fundamental	  to	  economic	  theory,	  guiding	  investment	  
decisions	  and	  underlying	  formal	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  calculation	  of	  net	  present	  value.	  Every	  business	  
decision,	  therefore,	  involves	  a	  present	  and	  future	  element.	  Usually,	  however,	  these	  future	  visions	  are	  
presented	  quantitatively,	  as	  a	  set	  of	  numbers	  extrapolating	  current	  trends.	  Walter	  Friedman	  has	  
explored	  the	  history	  of	  Harvard’s	  pioneering	  economic	  forecasting	  service4	  and	  written	  a	  biography	  of	  
Irving	  Fisher,	  premier	  economist	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  who	  wrote	  frequently	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  
future	  expectations	  to	  business	  people.	  Says	  Friedman:	  “More	  than	  any	  other	  economist	  of	  his	  time,	  
Fisher	  saw	  that	  a	  future-­‐orientation	  among	  businesspeople	  and	  entrepreneurs	  was	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  
business,	  and	  even	  more	  broadly,	  of	  capitalism.”5	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Carol	  Connell	  tells	  of	  the	  successful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Paul	  J.	  DiMaggio	  and	  Walter	  W.	  Powell,	  "The	  Iron	  Cage	  Revisited:	  Institutional	  Isomorphism	  and	  Collective	  
Rationality	  in	  Organizational	  Fields",	  American	  Sociological	  Review	  48,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1983):147-­‐160.	  
4	  Walter	  A.	  Friedman	  (2009)	  “The	  Harvard	  Economic	  Service	  and	  the	  Problems	  of	  Forecasting”,	  History	  of	  Political	  
Economy	  41,	  no.	  1:	  57-­‐88.	  
5	  Walter	  A.	  Friedman	  (2008)	  "Irving	  Fisher,	  Economic	  Forecasting,	  and	  the	  Myth	  of	  the	  Business	  Cycle."	  Harvard	  
Business	  School	  Working	  Paper,	  No.	  08-­‐037,	  p.	  5.	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efforts	  by	  Fritz	  Machlup	  to	  introduce	  scenario	  analysis	  as	  a	  method	  for	  collaborative	  exploration	  of	  
alternative	  futures	  by	  senior	  teams	  in	  government	  and	  corporations.6	  	  
Sometimes	  expectations	  of	  future	  change	  inspire	  institutional	  innovation.	  For	  instance,	  Schumpeter’s	  
celebrated	  concept	  of	  free	  market	  innovation	  through	  the	  creative	  destruction	  of	  outmoded	  
institutional	  forms	  depends	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  entrepreneur	  (or	  entrepreneurial	  organization)	  who	  
will	  see	  growth	  opportunities	  were	  no-­‐one	  else	  has.7	  	  The	  organisation	  problem	  for	  the	  entrepreneur	  
then	  becomes	  that	  of	  brining	  existing	  capabilities	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  new	  opportunity	  or	  creating	  the	  
necessary	  new	  capabilities	  and	  structures.	  8	  	  But	  once	  introduced,	  successful	  entrepreneurs	  will	  be	  
imitated	  because	  it	  is	  the	  attracting	  of	  other	  business	  people	  that	  which	  drives	  down	  entrepreneurial	  
profits.	  	  
Successful	   innovation	  therefore	  depends,	   implicitly	  at	   least,	  on	  convincing	  others	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
future	   in	  which	   the	   innovation	   is	  already	  accepted.	  Neil	  Pollock	  and	  Robin	  Williams	  have	  documented	  
the	  role	  of	   industry	  analysts,	  such	  as	  the	  Gartner	  Group,	   in	  shaping	  the	  adoption	  of	  technology.9	  They	  
categorized	  these	  “intermediaries	  specializing	   in	  the	  production,	  commodification	  and	  selling	  of	  future	  
oriented	  knowledge”	  as	  “promisary	  organizations.”	  The	  concept	  of	  an	  “imaginaire”	   (or	  “sociotechnical	  
imaginaire”)	   sometimes	   used	   in	   science	   and	   technology	   studies	   is	   also	   relevant.	   This	   French	   term	   is	  
roughly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  term	  “vision”	  used	  here,	  reflecting	  an	  imagined	  new	  social	  order	  built	  around	  
the	  deployment	  of	   an	   emerging,	   unproven	   technology	   in	   a	   particular	  way.	   The	   technology,	   in	   turn,	   is	  
shaped	  by	   this	   vision.10	   	  Management	   consultants	  have	  proven	   important	   in	   the	  diffusion	  of	   fads	  and	  
novelty	  within	  managerial	  discourse.11	   	  They	  have	  also	  been	  identified	  as	  key	  forces	  in	  the	  propagation	  
of	  new	  technologies	  within	  business,	  a	  process	  documented	  by	  Brian	  P.	  Bloomfield	  and	  Theo	  Vurdbukais	  
who	  argue	   in	  “The	  Vision	  Thing:	  Constructing	  Technology	  and	  the	  Future	   in	  Management	  Advice”	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Caroll	  Connell	  (2011)	  “Reforming	  the	  world	  monetary	  system:	  How	  Fritz	  Machlup	  built	  consensus	  among	  business	  
leaders	  and	  academics	  using	  scenario	  analysis”,	  Journal	  of	  Management	  History	  17	  (1):	  50-­‐65.	  
7	  We	  appreciate	  the	  comments	  of	  Lou	  Galambos	  in	  pointing	  us	  to	  Joseph	  A.	  Schumpeter	  (2003	  -­‐	  1943)	  Capitalism,	  
Socialism	  and	  Democracy	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge):	  82;	  and	  to	  Joseph	  A.	  Schumpeter	  (1939)	  Business	  
Cycles,	  New	  York,	  Toronto	  and	  London:	  McGraw-­‐Hill:	  19.	  
8	  Richard	  R.	  Langlois	  (2006)	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Industrial	  Capitalism	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge):	  12.	  
9	  N.	  Pollock	  &	  R.	  Williams,	  “The	  Business	  of	  Expectations:	  How	  Promissory	  Organizations	  Shape	  Technology	  and	  
Innovation,”	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  40(4),	  525-­‐548.	  
10	  For	  example	  P.	  Filchy	  (2007)	  The	  Internet	  Imaginarie	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press).	  
11	  Managers	  use	  narratives	  about	  new	  and	  fashionable	  techniques	  to	  communicate	  to	  organizational	  stakeholders	  
that	  their	  organizations	  conform	  to	  institutional	  norms	  mandating	  the	  use	  of	  these	  techniques.	  This	  can	  explain	  the	  
diffusion	  of	  management	  techniques	  across	  thousands	  of	  dissimilar	  organizations.	  See	  Eric	  Abrahamson	  and	  
Gregory	  Fairchild	  “Management	  Fashion”	  	  Administrative	  Science	  Quarterly	  44	  (1999):708-­‐740.	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building	   a	   showcase	   facility	   demonstrating	   the	   retail	   world	   of	   the	   future	   allowed	   one	   major	   firm	   to	  
construct	  both	  “expert	  knowledge	  and	  client	  ignorance”	  to	  promote	  its	  services.	  12	  
The	  reminder	  of	  this	  article	  illustrates	  the	  idea	  of	  mimetic	  and	  normative	  isomorphism	  through	  shared	  
visions	   of	   the	   future	   of	   retail	   banking	   centered	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   cashless-­‐checkless	   society.13	  	  
Originating	  in	  the	  1950s,	  the	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	  vision	  was	  still	  operating	  as	  a	  powerful	  force	  for	  
mimetic	  isomorphism	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  supporting	  the	  deployment	  of	  inexpensive	  point-­‐of-­‐
sale	   (POS)	   terminals	   that	  could	  capture	  personal	   identification	  numbers	   (PINs)	  and	  transaction	  details,	  
standardized	   machine-­‐readable	   cards,	   and	   single-­‐message	   authentication	   and	   clearing	   networks.	  
Variants	  of	  this	  vision	  appear	  throughout	  the	  developed	  world	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  but	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  and	  brevity,	  we	  will	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  form	  it	  took	  in	  the	  United	  
States	   from	   the	   1950s	   through	   the	   1970s.14	  We	   explores	   its	   emergence,	   early	   conflicts	   to	   define	   the	  
concept	  when	   trying	   to	  apply	   it	  by	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  a	   failed	  efforts	  by	   the	  VISA	  organization	   to	  
deploy	  a	  comprehensive	  payments	  product	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  
The	  Imaginaire	  of	  the	  Cashless-­‐Checkless	  Society	  	  
So	  where	  do	   these	   imaginaires	   come	   from?	  What	   sphere	  do	   they	   inhabit?	  Some	  visions	  of	   the	   future	  
feature	   prominently	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   proper	   role	   of	   information	   technology	   in	   business.	   For	  
instance,	   in	   1958	   Business	   Week	   reported	   that	   the	   installation	   by	   General	   Electric	   in	   1954	   of	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Bloomfield,	  Brian	  P,	  and	  Theo	  Vurdubakis.	  "The	  vision	  thing:	  constructing	  technology	  and	  the	  future	  in	  
management	  advice."	  In	  Critical	  Consulting:	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Management	  Advice	  Industry,	  edited	  by	  
Timothy	  Clarke	  and	  Fincham	  Robin,	  115-­‐129.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2002. On	  consulting	  more	  generally,	  see	  Matthias	  
Kipping	  and	  Lars	  Engwall	  (2003)	  Management	  Consulting:	  Emergence	  and	  Dynamics	  of	  a	  Knowledge	  Industry	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press);	  Christopher	  McKenna	  (2006)	  The	  World’s	  Newest	  Profession:	  Management	  
Consulting	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press).	  
13	  Since	  the	  discussion	  deals	  with	  cash	  and	  payment	  systems,	  money	  is	  at	  the	  center	  stage.	  Money	  has	  unique	  
qualities	  and	  has	  long	  had	  a	  charged	  political	  and	  cultural	  symbolism.	  But	  this	  paper	  is	  concerned	  not	  with	  the	  
nature	  of	  money	  itself,	  nor	  the	  money	  supply,	  but	  with	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  a	  society	  to	  exchange	  means	  of	  
payment.	  Of	  course,	  changes	  to	  these	  mechanisms	  can	  and	  did	  create	  anxiety	  amongst	  politicians	  and	  the	  general	  
public,	  but	  those	  within	  the	  banking	  industry	  were	  focused	  more	  on	  how	  these	  changes	  might	  contain	  the	  costs	  of	  
processing	  paper-­‐based	  payments	  (including	  fraud).	  Computer	  technology	  was	  seen	  as	  key	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  See	  
further	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  Technological	  Innovation.In	  this	  context,	  the	  cashless-­‐paperless	  society	  is	  a	  guiding	  
principle	  for	  a	  collective.	  A	  guiding	  light	  that	  comes	  and	  goes	  out	  of	  fashion.	  Our	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  analyse	  how	  
specific	  actions	  intertwined	  with	  the	  actors’	  expectations.	  
14	  A	  brief	  example	  to	  illustrate	  the	  variations	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “cashless	  society”	  can	  be	  found	  by	  searching	  
Google’s	  library	  of	  digitalized	  books	  (Google’s	  Ngram	  Viewer).	  This	  search	  suggests	  that	  “cashless	  society”	  
appeared	  in	  1959,	  peaked	  at	  2.00E-­‐08	  of	  all	  English	  books	  in	  1973	  and	  oscillated	  between	  that	  peak	  and	  1.00E-­‐08	  
until	  2008.	  	  Whereas	  “electronic	  payments”	  appeared	  in	  1962,	  peaked	  at	  4.00E-­‐08	  in	  2000	  and	  remained	  well	  
above	  3.50E-­‐08	  thereafter	  until	  2008.	  One	  can	  only	  speculate	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  behavior	  but,	  perhaps,	  the	  
negative	  connotations	  of	  “cashless”	  has	  limited	  its	  use;	  whereas	  “electronic”	  has	  a	  more	  modern,	  forward	  looking	  
ring	  to	  it.	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automated	  payroll	  processing	  for	  its	  Louisville,	  Kentucky	  plant	  (using	  technology	  originally	  designed	  for	  
military	   purposes)	   had	   been	   the	   start	   of	   a	   “new	   industrial	   revolution”15	   which	   it	   characterized	   as	  
“perplexing	  and	  disgruntled—but	   inevitable…	  because	  computers	   still	  hold	   the	  key	   to	  new	  systems	  or	  
organization	  for	  the	  sprawling	  giants	  of	  industry,	  commerce,	  and	  government…”16	  
In	   fact	   the	   Louisville	   project	   was	   a	   debacle,	   as	   the	   new	   system	   took	  much	   longer	   to	   implement	   and	  
accomplished	   much	   less	   than	   expected.	   Other	   early	   adopters	   of	   computer	   technology	   faced	   similar	  
problems.	  Yet	  this	  sense	  of	  historical	   inevitability	  served	  the	  computer	   industry	  well	   in	  the	  decades	  to	  
come.	  As	  you	  may	  recall	  from	  the	  “productivity	  paradox”	  debate	  of	  the	  late	  1990s,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  past	  
few	  years	  that	  economists	  have	  been	  able	  to	  state	  with	  confidence	  that	  the	  massive	  investments	  made	  
by	  business	  in	  information	  technology	  have	  actually	  improved	  corporate	  performance.17	  	  
Other	   visions	  of	   the	   future	  of	   technology	  emerge	  within	   and	  are	   shaped	  by	   the	   interaction	  of	  people	  
with	   similar	   interests.	   For	   instance,	   the	   late	   Rob	   Kling	   wrote	   frequently	   of	   the	   power	   of	  
“computerization	   movements,”	   stressing	   the	   role	   of	   social	   groups	   in	   constructing	   the	   apparent	  
inevitability	   of	   technological	   change.18	   These	   movements	   spread	   in	   industry	   associations	   as	   well	   as	  
occupational	   groups.	   Within	   the	   study	   of	   financial	   intermediation,	   JoAnne	   Yates	   has	   explored	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Life	  Office	  Management	  Association,	  a	  trade	  group,	  in	  shaping	  technology	  use	  within	  
its	  industry.	  Similar	  developments	  have	  also	  been	  documented	  for	  Spanish	  and	  Swedish	  savings	  banks,	  
where,	  as	  was	   the	  case	   for	   the	  US	   insurers,	   long	  before	  any	  single	   firm	  had	  an	  established	  and	  stable	  
computing	   operation,	   association	   members	   were	   swapping	   ideas,	   sharing	   initial	   experiences,	   and	  
legitimating	  particular	  applications	  of	  the	  new	  technology.19	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Roddy	  F.	  Osborn,	  "GE	  and	  UNIVAC:	  Harnessing	  the	  High-­‐Speed	  Computer",	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  32,	  no.	  4	  
(July-­‐August	  1954):99-­‐107.	  
16	  Idem.	  
17	  This	  “paradox”	  refers	  to	  the	  claim	  by	  Robert	  Solow,	  economist	  at	  the	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  and	  
Nobel	  Laureate	  in	  Economics	  (1987),	  that	  “the	  computer	  revolution	  is	  everywhere	  but	  in	  the	  productivity	  
statistics”.	  	  Although	  scholars	  (including	  Solow)	  now	  agree	  that	  information	  technology	  has	  played	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  the	  acceleration	  of	  productivity	  in	  the	  USA	  since	  1973	  (and	  particularly	  between	  1995	  and	  2000),	  there	  is	  far	  
less	  agreement	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  applications	  of	  computer	  technology	  have	  contributed	  to	  this	  productivity	  
revival.	  Reasons	  for	  this	  disagreement	  include	  methodological	  differences	  between	  estimates,	  which	  create	  a	  wide	  
variation	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect.	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  agreement	  that	  there	  are	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  effects	  
of	  IT	  investments	  between	  firms,	  with	  some	  reaping	  extraordinary	  productivity	  gains	  and	  others	  little	  or	  no	  gain.	  
See	  further	  Eric	  Brynholfson	  and	  Adam	  Saunders,	  Wired	  for	  Innovation	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  2010).	  
18	  Rob	  Kling	  and	  S	  Iacono,	  "The	  Mobilization	  of	  Support	  for	  Computerization:	  The	  Role	  	  of	  Computerization	  
Movements",	  Social	  Problems	  35,	  no.	  3	  (June	  1988):226-­‐343.	  
19	  JoAnne	  Yates,	  Structuring	  the	  Information	  Age	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Bernardo	  
Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  and	  J.	  C.	  Maixé-­‐Altés	  “Managing	  Technological	  Change	  by	  Committee:	  	  The	  Origins	  of	  Data	  Processing	  
Networks	  in	  Spanish	  and	  British	  Savings	  Banks	  (c.	  1960-­‐1988)”	  Revista	  de	  Historia	  Industrial	  	  47	  (November	  2011):	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Yates	   has	   also	   documented	   the	   importance	   of	   Edmund	   Berkeley,	   a	   procedures	   expert	   at	   Prudential	  
Insurance,	   in	   launching	   the	   automation	  movement	   within	   the	   Life	   Office	  Management	   Association.20	  
Berkeley	   not	   only	   persuaded	   his	   employer	   to	   become	   the	   first	   business	   to	   order	   a	   programmable	  
electronic	  computer	  but	  also	  wrote	  Giant	  Brains,	  the	  first	  popular	  guide	  to	  computers.	  21	  This	  did	  a	  great	  
deal	  to	  shape	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  around	  which	  the	  computerization	  movement	  gathered.	  Berkeley	  
discussed	  the	  actual	  capabilities	  of	  the	  first	  computers,	  but	  presented	  this	  information	  primarily	  as	  a	  set	  
of	   clues	   to	   what	   would	   be	   accomplished	   by	   the	  machines	   of	   the	   near	   future.	   He	   forecast	   automatic	  
translation	   and	   handwriting	   recognition	   as	   immediate	   applications,	   with	   weather	   control,	   automated	  
psychiatrists,	   and	  pocket	  machines	   to	   calculate	   income	   tax	  and	   store	  addresses	   to	   follow	   later.	   	   In	   its	  
final	  chapter	  he	  explored	  the	  potential	  hazards	  of	   this	   future,	  worrying	  about	   the	  dangers	   that	   robots	  
would	   revolt	   or	   be	   used	   destructively	   by	   “antisocial	   human	   beings”	   and	   proposed	   an	   international	  
regime	  of	  inspections	  to	  avoid	  it.	  He	  concluded	  with	  the	  promise	  that	  can	  “welcome	  the	  robot	  machine	  
as	  our	  deliverer	  from	  the	  long	  hard	  chores	  of	  many	  centuries.”	  
This	  seems	  to	  have	  set	  a	  template	  for	  other	  writers	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  of	  information	  technology	  in	  
business.	   Indeed,	   the	   very	   term	  “information	   technology”	  was	   introduced	   in	   a	  1958	  Harvard	  Business	  
Review	   article	   called	   “Management	   in	   the	   1980s.”22	   Its	   authors	   treated	   their	   readers	   to	   a	   sketch	   of	  
managerial	   practice	   in	   the	   far-­‐off	   world	   of	   the	   late	   twentieth	   century,	   by	   which	   point	   the	   computer	  
revolution	   would	   have	   run	   its	   course.	   Its	   authors	   promised	   that	   a	   computer	   would	   be	   world	   chess	  
champion	   by	   1968	   and,	   more	   relevantly,	   that	   “top	   management	   [will]	   become	  more	   abstract,	   more	  
search-­‐and-­‐research	   oriented	   and	   correspondingly	   less	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   making	   of	   routine	  
decisions….”	   (272)	  This	   futuristic	  would	  be	  more	  hospitable	   to	  academics,	  “researchers,	  or	  people	   like	  
researches,	  will	  sit	  closer	  to	  the	  top	  floor	  of	  American	  companies…	  we	  might	  expect	  more	  impersonal,	  
problem-­‐oriented	  behavior	  at	  the	  top,	  with	  less	  emphasis	  on	  loyalty	  to	  the	  firm	  and	  more	  on	  relatively	  
rational	   concern	  with	   solving	  difficult	   problems.”	   (272/273)	   This	   is	   a	   nice	   example	  of	   the	   tendency	  of	  
particular	   groups	   to	   put	   their	   own	   spin	   on	   shared	   futuristic	   visions,	   emphasizing	   their	   own	   areas	   of	  
expertise.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117-­‐150;	  Bernardo	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo,	  Tobias	  Karlsson	  and	  Bjorn	  Thodenius,	  “Building	  Bankomat:	  The	  Development	  of	  On-­‐
Line,	  Real-­‐Time	  Systems	  in	  British	  and	  Swedish	  Savings	  Banks,	  c.1965-­‐1985”,	  Association	  of	  Business	  Historians	  
Annual	  Conference	  (Liverpool:	  2009).	  
20	  JoAnne	  Yates,	  "Early	  Interactions	  Between	  the	  Life	  Insurance	  and	  Computer	  Industries:	  The	  Prudential's	  Edmund	  
C.	  Berkeley",	  IEEE	  Annals	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Computing	  19,	  no.	  3	  (July-­‐September	  1997).	  
21	  Edmund	  C.	  Berkeley,	  Giant	  Brains	  or	  Machines	  That	  Think	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  1949).	  
22	  Harold	  J.	  Leavitt	  and	  Thomas	  L.	  Whisler,	  "Management	  in	  the	  1980s",	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  36,	  no.	  6	  
(November-­‐December	  1958):41-­‐48.	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However,	  hunts	  for	  earliest	  speculative	  depictions	  of	  particular	  technologies	  most	  often	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  
world	   of	   science	   fiction.	   Jules	   Verne	  wrote	   about	   space	   travel,	   air	   travel,	   and	   long-­‐range	   submarines	  
decades	  before	  such	  things	  existed.	  H.G.	  Wells	  warned	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  prior	  to	  
the	   First	   World	   War.	   As	   science	   fiction	   emerged	   as	   a	   distinct	   genre	   in	   the	   1930s	   and	   1940s	   its	  
practitioners	  prided	  themselves	  on	  their	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  skillful	  extrapolation.	  Arthur	  C.	  Clarke	  
claimed	   to	  have	  been	   the	   first	   to	  conceive	  of	  a	  geosynchronous	   communications	  satellite	  while	  moon	  
missions,	   space	   stations	   and	   atomic	   weapons	   were	   fictional	   commonplaces	   long	   before	   their	   actual	  
debut.	   The	   1990s	   saw	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   Internet	   into	   business	   and	   an	   accompanying	   media	   frenzy	  
around	   the	   idea	   of	   doing	   business	   in	   “cyberspace.”	   The	   latter	   was	   quite	   literally	   a	   science	   fiction	  
concept,	  coined	  by	  fiction	  writer	  William	  Gibson.23	  More	  prosaically,	  Robert	  A.	  Heinlein	  took	  credit	   for	  
the	  waterbed.	  	  
In	   contrast,	   the	  vision	  of	  a	   “cashless	   society”	  appears	   to	  have	  originated	  within	   the	  world	  of	  business	  
and	  moved	  only	  later	   into	  the	  realm	  of	  fiction.	   	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  idea	  is	  associated	  
with	  the	  computerization	  of	  retail	  financial	  intermediaries.	  Banks	  in	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  began	  to	  
adopt	  computers	  and	  telecommunications	  starting	  in	  the	  1950s.	  As	  early	  as	  1954,	  business	  technology	  
researchers	  and	  consultants	  in	  the	  USA	  started	  to	  discuss	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  “checkless	  society”	  where	  
sleek,	   efficient,	   and	   safe	   electronic	   messages	   would	   replace	   cumbersome,	   costly,	   and	   easily-­‐forged	  
paper	  checks.24	  Once	  the	  major	  banks	  digitized	  their	  accounts,	  they	  argued,	  it	  would	  be	  relatively	  simple	  
to	   connect	   their	   computers	   over	   a	   telecommunications	   network,	   and	  process	  most	   routine	  payments	  
entirely	  in	  electronic	  form.	  A	  few	  of	  them	  even	  predicted	  that	  paper	  notes	  and	  coins	  would	  eventually	  
be	   replaced	   by	   a	   nationwide	   electronic	   funds	   transfer	   system	   (EFTS),	   activated	   by	   some	   kind	   of	  
economic	  identification	  card,	  ushering	  in	  a	  completely	  “cashless-­‐checkless	  society.”	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  readers	  and	  writers	  of	  science	  fiction	  were	  perhaps	  more	  interested	  in	  rockets	  and	  
physics	   than	   they	  were	   in	   banking,	   economics,	   or	   organizational	   innovation.	  When	   a	   fictional	   society	  
was	   cashless	   it	  was	   generally	   also	   a	  moneyless	  utopia,	   as	  with	   the	  payment	   cards	  used	  by	   citizens	   to	  
spend	  their	  standard	  allocation	  of	  “credit”	  in	  Edward	  Bellamy’s	  highly	  influential	  socialist	  novel	  Looking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  startlingly	  rapid	  process	  by	  which	  “cyberspace”	  passed	  from	  science	  fiction	  into	  business	  and	  political	  
discourse	  is	  explored	  in	  Turner,	  Fred.	  From	  Counterculture	  to	  Cyberculture:	  Stewart	  Brand,	  the	  Whole	  Earth	  
Network,	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Digital	  Utopianism.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2006.	  
24	  See	  Robert	  Gregory	  and	  Herbert	  Jacobs,	  Jr.,	  “A	  Study	  of	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Credit	  in	  Relation	  to	  the	  Banking	  
System,”	  MIT	  Dynamic	  Analysis	  and	  Control	  Laboratory	  Report	  no.	  87	  (1954).	  The	  term	  was	  then	  introduced	  in	  
Britain	  by	  the	  New	  York	  correspondent	  of	  the	  Financial	  Times	  in	  1966	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  study	  by	  the	  Diebold	  
Group	  into	  the	  subject	  (“Towards	  a	  cashless	  society”,	  Financial	  Times,	  August	  6th,	  1966,	  p.	  3).	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Backward	   (1888).25	  Capitalism	  was	  the	  default	  social	  organization	  of	  American	  science	   fiction,	  but	   few	  
authors	   put	   much	   attention	   into	   imagining	   its	   future.26	   By	   the	   1940s	   many	   had	   adopted	   the	   term	  
“credit”	  as	  the	  universal	  name	  for	  future	  currencies,	  including	  Isaac	  Asimov	  for	  his	  two	  main	  strands	  of	  
work	   (the	   far-­‐future	   Foundation	   saga	   and	   the	   near	   future	   Robot	   stories).	   Usually,	   however,	   this	  
functioned	  as	  a	   simple	   linguistic	   substitution	   for	   “dollar”	  and	  one	   reads	  of	   credits	  being	   slapped	  onto	  
counters,	  flung	  to	  parking	  attendants,	  drawn	  from	  pockets,	  and	  the	  like.	  So	  for	  most	  authors	  use	  of	  the	  
term	  did	  not	  imply	  automatic	  processing	  of	  payments.	  A	  partial	  exception	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  early	  work	  
of	  Robert	  A.	  Heinlein,	  whose	  interest	  in	  economics	  and	  the	  workings	  of	  capitalism	  was	  unusual	  among	  
the	   science	   fiction	   writers	   of	   his	   generation.	   His	   utopian	   early	   novel	   Beyond	   This	   Horizon	   (1948)	  
described	  a	  communications	  network	  spanning	  North	  and	  South	  America.	  An	  automated	  cash	  register,	  
which	  he	  dubbed	  the	  “auto-­‐clerk”	  would	  encode	  every	  sales	   transaction	  onto	  paper	  tape.	  These	  were	  
aggregated	  and	  fed	  into	  a	  “huge	  integrating	  accumulator”	  (i.e.	  a	  computer,	  to	  use	  the	  term	  that	  had	  not	  
yet	  been	   standardized)	   in	   the	  Department	  of	   Finance.27	  However	   the	   function	  of	   this	  machine	  was	   to	  
make	   macroeconomic	   corrections	   to	   keep	   the	   economy	   running	   smoothly,	   rather	   than	   to	   maintain	  
individual	  accounts.	  
Although	   the	  cashless-­‐checkless	   society	   remained	  mostly	  a	  banker’s	  dream	  throughout	   the	  1950s	  and	  
early-­‐1960s,	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1960s	   its	   advocates	   could	   make	   a	   persuasive	   case	   for	   the	   need	   to	   consider	  
electronic	   replacements	   to	   paper	   checks.	   Over	   the	   decade,	   the	   volume	   of	   checks	   processed	   by	   the	  
Federal	  Reserve	  had	  risen	  from	  14	  billion	  a	  year	  in	  1955	  to	  nearly	  22	  billion	  (about	  60	  million	  each	  day),	  
and	   the	   projected	   rate	   of	   growth	   for	   the	   next	   decade	   was	   even	   higher.28	   Even	   with	   magnetic	   ink	  
character	   recognition	   (MICR)	   and	   high-­‐speed	   check	   sorters,	   the	   Fed	  was	   already	   finding	   it	   difficult	   to	  
keep	   up	  with	   the	   explosive	   volume.	   This	   increasing	   volume	  was	   also	   incurring	   a	   significant	  monetary	  
cost.	  At	  this	  time,	  all	  paper	  checks	  written	  in	  the	  United	  States	  had	  to	  be	  physically	  sorted,	  routed,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Edward	  Bellamy	  (2000	  )	  Looking	  Backward,	  London:	  William	  Reeves	  [1888].	  
26	  	  Leading	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  inconsistencies,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  Star	  Trek	  universe.	  See	  
http://www.sffchronicles.co.uk/forum/16664-­‐money-­‐in-­‐star-­‐trek.html	  (accessed	  24	  June	  2011).	  
27	  Robert	  A	  Heinlein,	  Beyond	  This	  Horizon	  (Reading,	  PA:	  Fantasy	  Press,	  1948),	  3-­‐7.	  See	  also	  the	  discussion	  
of	  economics	  and	  the	  role	  of	  government	  on	  pages	  71-­‐72	  and	  102-­‐3.	  
28	  Norris	  Lee,	  “Tomorrow’s	  Checkless,	  Cashless	  Society:	  the	  Problems,	  the	  Solutions,	  the	  Benefits,”	  Management	  
Review	  (September	  1967):	  58-­‐62.	  Another	  contemporary	  study	  estimated	  a	  similar	  trend	  but	  of	  different	  
magnitude	  as	  it	  stated	  that	  approximately	  one	  and	  a	  half	  billion	  checks	  were	  cleared	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  1939,	  and	  this	  
volume	  increased	  to	  6.5	  billion	  in	  in	  1950	  and	  to	  13	  billion	  in	  1960	  (Boris	  Yavitz,	  Automation	  in	  Commercial	  
Banking;	  New	  York,	  1967,	  p.	  11).	  Both	  these	  estimates	  concur	  in	  identifying	  a	  spectacular	  rise	  in	  check	  volume	  and	  
activity,	  with	  no	  corresponding	  increase	  in	  the	  value	  of	  deposits,	  thus	  placing	  a	  severe	  strain	  on	  the	  US	  banking	  
system.	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delivered	   to	   the	   issuing	   branch	   before	   the	   check	  was	   settled	   and	   final	   payment	  made.29	   This	   process	  
incurred	  not	  only	  significant	  handling	  and	  transportation	  costs	  (estimated	  at	  $3.5	  billion	  per	  year),	  but	  
also	  “float”	  costs	  for	  the	  depositing	  institution	  until	  settlement	  was	  received.30	  Handling	  costs	  are	  per-­‐
check,	   but	   float	   costs	   are	   per-­‐dollar,	   so	   any	   further	   increases	   in	   volume,	   or	   delays	   in	   clearing,	  would	  
result	   in	   significant	   cost	   increases.31	   This	   talk	   of	   a	   crisis	  was	   itself	   speculative	   –	   during	   the	   1960s	   the	  
American	   banking	   industry	   was	   heavily	   regulated,	   highly	   fragmented,	   reliably	   profitable	   without	   any	  
driving	  need	  for	  operational	  efficiency,	  and	  stable	  to	  the	  point	  of	  dullness.	  If	  it	  was	  hard	  for	  a	  bank	  to	  fail	  
then	   it	   was	   also	   hard	   for	   a	   banker	   to	   stand	   out.	   Indeed	   the	   high	   technology	   vision	   of	   the	   cashless-­‐
checkless	  society	  seems	  to	  have	  appealed	  to	  younger	  and	  more	  ambitious	  members	  of	  the	  industry	  as	  a	  
way	  of	  overcoming	  the	  image	  of	  their	  industry	  as	  a	  conservative	  backwater.	  	  
Discussion	   of	   the	   power	   of	   new	   computer	   technology	   to	   transform	  business	   and	  management	  was	   a	  
staple	  of	  the	  American	  business	  literature	  of	  the	  1960s.	  Haigh	  has	  written	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  idea	  
of	   the	   “totally	   integrated	   management	   information	   system,”	   a	   massive	   online	   computer	   system	  
automating	   all	   routine	   business	   processes,	   providing	   every	   manager	   with	   exactly	   the	   information	  
needed	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   duties,	   and	   incorporating	   advanced	   simulation	   and	   forecasting	   techniques.	  
This	   vision	   held	   together	   a	   powerful	   alliance	   of	   computer	   vendors,	   consultants,	   academics	   and	   other	  
experts	  for	  much	  of	  the	  decade	  –	  even	  though	  no	  company	  succeeded	  in	  building	  a	  system	  of	  this	  kind.32	  
Two	  actors	  in	  particular	  seem	  to	  have	  established	  the	  initial	  framing	  of	  this	  volume	  crisis	  and	  promoted	  
the	   concept	  of	   the	   cashless-­‐checkless	   society	   as	   the	   appropriate	   solution.	   The	   first	  was	   John	  Diebold,	  
who	  had	  earlier	  popularized	  the	  term	  “automation.”	  His	  consulting	  firm,	  The	  Diebold	  Group,	  constructed	  
several	  networked	  computer	  systems	  for	  commercial	  banks	   in	   the	  early	  1960s,	  and	  began	  researching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This	  remained	  true	  until	  2003,	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  “Check	  21”	  act.	  
30	  While	  the	  check	  passed	  through	  the	  clearing	  system,	  which	  could	  take	  several	  days,	  the	  depositing	  institution	  
had	  to	  pay	  interest	  on	  the	  deposited	  funds	  and	  often	  make	  some	  portion	  of	  those	  funds	  available	  to	  the	  depositor,	  
even	  though	  the	  depositing	  bank	  would	  not	  receive	  payment	  from	  the	  check-­‐issuer	  until	  the	  clearing	  process	  was	  
complete.	  
31	  These	  costs	  were	  also	  more	  pronounced	  in	  the	  United	  States	  than	  in	  other	  countries	  due	  to	  several	  reasons.	  
These	  included	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  banks.	  In	  1966,	  there	  were	  14,000	  banks	  in	  the	  nation,	  so	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  
check	  needed	  to	  go	  through	  the	  national	  clearing	  system	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  fewer	  banks	  per	  capita.	  
Another	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  use	  of	  personal	  checks	  in	  the	  USA	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  other	  countries.	  In	  Spain,	  for	  
instance,	  their	  penetration	  as	  a	  means	  of	  payment	  remained	  negligible	  even	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  check	  
guarantee	  cards	  in	  1971	  (see	  further	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  and	  Maixé-­‐Altés	  “Managing	  Technological	  Change	  by	  Committee”,	  
op.	  cit.).	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the	  more	  general	  impacts	  of	  automation	  on	  the	  banking	  industry	  as	  early	  as	  1966.33	  Diebold	  himself	  also	  
wrote	  articles	  in	  leading	  business	  journals,	  warning	  of	  an	  impending	  “transaction	  overload”	  and	  stating	  
that	  “the	  ‘cashless	  society’	   is	  no	  longer	  an	  option	  but	  a	  necessity….”34	  Although	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  
there	   was	   “considerable	   vagueness”	   surrounding	   the	   actual	   details	   of	   how	   such	   a	   society	   might	   be	  
achieved,	  he	  nevertheless	  argued	  that	  “some	  system	  must	  and	  will	  develop	  in	  which	  money	  (and	  credit)	  
moves	  quickly	  and	  safely”	  around	  the	  world.	  
This	  vision	  won	   influential	   support	   from	  George	  Mitchell,	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	   the	  
Federal	  Reserve,	  who	  began	  warning	  bankers	  in	  1966	  of	  the	  increasing	  costs	  of	  processing	  paper	  checks,	  
urging	  the	  banking	  industry	  to	  consider	  how	  “the	  computer	  can	  drastically	  change	  money	  and	  its	  use.”35	  
Electronic	  payments,	  he	  argued,	  would	  reduce	  both	  the	  handling	  and	  float	  costs,	  as	  transfers	  could	  be	  
achieved	   nearly	   instantaneously.	   He	   predicted	   that	   the	   use	   of	   checks	   would	   disappear	   within	   “the	  
discernable	   future,	   probably	   much	   sooner	   than	  most	   of	   us	   expect,”	   and	   that	   paper	   notes	   and	   coins	  
would	  soon-­‐after	  be	  relegated	  to	  increasingly	  limited	  uses.36	  
Despite	   a	   lack	   of	   concrete	   details,	   these	   early	   social	   entrepreneurs	   did	   help	   convince	   the	   American	  
Bankers	  Association	  (ABA)	  to	  begin	   investigating	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	   in	  1967.	  
Dale	  Reistad,	  the	  ABA’s	  Director	  of	  Automation,	  predicted	  that	  it	  was	  “nearly	  inevitable	  that	  the	  banking	  
system…will	   reverse	   itself	   and	   develop	   a	   ‘checkless’	   system”	   by	   1980,	   soon	   followed	   by	   a	   drastic	  
reduction	   in	   the	   use	   of	   cash	   by	   businesses	   and	   consumers.37	   He	   also	   formed	   a	   “Checkless	   Society	  
Committee”	   to	   determine	   “if	   the	   American	   economy	   can	   really	   function	   without	   bank	   checks”	   and	  
answer	  the	  question	  “what	  must	  the	  banking	  industry	  do	  today	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  eventualities	  of	  the	  
future?”38	  The	  committee	   invited	  equipment	  vendors	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  most	  advanced	  wares,	  and	  
encouraged	  them	  to	  develop	  point-­‐of-­‐sale	  terminals	  capable	  of	  initiating	  transactions	  in	  electronic	  form.	  
The	  committee	  also	  asked	  retailers	  to	  parley	  about	  strategies	  for	  transitioning	  towards	  a	  checkless,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Diebold	  Group,	  Summary	  Report	  of	  a	  Survey	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Electronics	  on	  Money	  and	  Credit	  (1966)	  
34	  John	  Diebold,	  “When	  Money	  Grows	  in	  Computers,”	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  World	  Business	  (Nov-­‐Dec	  1967):	  39-­‐46.	  
35	  George	  Mitchell,	  “Governor	  Mitchell	  Considers	  Tomorrow’s	  Banking,”	  Banking	  (Dec	  1966):	  33-­‐34.	  	  In	  a	  parallel	  
development,	  the	  narrative	  of	  cost	  reduction	  to	  justify	  capital	  investments	  around	  computer	  technology	  was	  quite	  
common	  in	  the	  early	  and	  mid	  1960s	  in	  several	  European	  countries.	  See	  further	  Bernardo	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo,	  J.	  Carles	  
Maixé-­‐Altés	  and	  Paul	  Thomes,	  Technological	  Innovation	  in	  Retail	  Finance:	  International	  Historical	  Perspectives	  
(New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2010).	  	  
36	  George	  Mitchell,	  “Effects	  of	  Automation	  on	  the	  Structure	  and	  Function	  of	  Banking,”	  The	  American	  Economic	  
Review	  (vol.	  56,	  no.	  1,	  Mar	  1966):	  159-­‐166.	  
37	  Dale	  Reistad,	  “The	  Coming	  Cashless	  Society,”	  Business	  Horizons	  (Fall	  1967):	  23-­‐32.	  The	  “reversal”	  he	  referred	  to	  
was	  a	  move	  away	  from	  making	  the	  processing	  of	  paper	  checks	  more	  efficient	  in	  favor	  of	  completely	  electronic	  
clearing.	  
38	  “Checkless	  Society	  Check,”	  Banking	  (May	  1967):	  115.	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then	  eventually	  cashless	  retailing	  environment.	  And	  most	  importantly,	  the	  committee	  held	  a	  number	  of	  
workshops	   on	   electronic	   payments	   for	   bankers	   across	   the	   nation,	   establishing	   a	   common	   vision	   that	  
would	  guide	  the	  actions	  of	  many	  bankers	  for	  the	  next	  several	  decades.39	  A	  computerization	  movement	  
was	  well	  underway.	  
Advocacy	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   computers	   and	   telecommunications	   tended	   to	   come	   from	   the	   middle	  
levels	   of	  management,	   not	   the	   upper	   levels.	   A	   good	   example	   in	   the	  US	   is	   Citibank’s	   John	   Reed,	  who	  
joined	  the	  bank	  in	  1965	  after	  graduating	  from	  MIT’s	  Sloan	  School	  of	  Management.	  In	  1969,	  at	  the	  tender	  
age	  of	  29,	  he	  took	  over	  Citibank’s	  Operating	  Group,	  and	  began	  to	  automate	  their	  entire	  back	  office.	  By	  
the	  time	  he	  was	  done	  six	  years	  later,	  the	  back	  operations	  “more	  closely	  resembled	  an	  assembly	  line	  at	  
General	  Motors	   than	   anything	  bankers	  were	  used	   to….”	  Reed	   then	  moved	  on	   to	   lead	  Citibank’s	   push	  
into	   consumer	   banking	   services	   (which	   was	   rooted	   in	   automated,	   self-­‐service	   terminals),	   eventually	  
taking	  over	  as	  Chairman	  in	  1984.40	  
The	  same	  trend	  is	  evident	  in	  several	  European	  countries.	  For	  instance,	  prior	  experience	  with	  automation	  
and	   the	  deployment	  of	  mechanical	  and	  electromechanical	  accounting	  devices	   in	  British	  banks,	   savings	  
banks	  and	  building	  societies	  placed	  accountants	  and/or	  staff	  at	  Operations	  and	  Methods	  Departments	  
making	   critical	   decisions	   in	   the	   selection	   and	   adoption	   of	   computer	   equipment.41	   	   Bátiz-­‐Lazo	   et	   al.	  
document	   how	   the	   computerization	   of	   Swedish	   savings	   banks	  was	   spearheaded	   by	   a	   group	   of	   young	  
managers	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Sven	   G	   Svensson	   director	   of	   Sparfrämjandet	   (the	   propaganda	  
department	   of	   the	   Swedish	   savings	   banks	   association).42	   During	   the	   1950s	   they	   met	   at	   annual	  
conferences	   the	   1950s	   at	   the	   resort	   town	   of	   Saltsjöbaden	   (in	   the	   Stockholm	   archipelago).	   They	  were	  
united	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  savings	  banks	  had	  to	  adjust	  to	  on	  going	  social	  change	  and	  meet	  the	  challenge	  
of	  commercial	  banks	  (not	  by	  demanding	  protection	  from	  the	  state	  but	  by	   introducing	  better	  services).	  	  
The	  computerisation	  of	  banking	  services	  was	  seen	  as	  key	  aspect	  to	  meet	  these	  challenges.	  Many	  ideas	  
that	  came	  out	  of	  the	  conferences	  at	  Saltsjöbaden	  were	  implemented	  during	  the	  1960s	  as	  the	  attendants	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  “	  ‘Checkless	  Society’	  Moves	  Toward	  the	  Drawing	  Board,”	  Banking	  (August	  1967):	  93.	  The	  chairman	  of	  this	  
committee	  also	  used	  the	  banking	  and	  business	  trade	  press	  to	  sell	  the	  vision—for	  example,	  see	  Robert	  L	  Kramer	  
and	  W	  Putnam	  Livingston,	  “Cashing	  in	  on	  the	  Checkless	  Society,”	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  (Sept-­‐Oct	  1967):	  141-­‐
149.	  
40	  Joseph	  Nocera,	  A	  Piece	  of	  the	  Action:	  How	  the	  Middle	  Class	  Joined	  the	  Money	  Class	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  
Schuster):	  141-­‐144.	  The	  role	  of	  middle	  management	  in	  triggering	  the	  organizational	  adoption	  of	  new	  technologies	  
and	  shaping	  their	  deployment	  is	  documented	  in	  Thomas,	  Robert	  Joseph.	  What	  Machines	  Can't	  Do:	  Politics	  and	  
Technology	  in	  the	  Industrial	  Enterprise.	  Berkley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1994.	  
41	  Bernardo	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  and	  Peter	  Wardley,	  “Banking	  on	  Change:	  Information	  Systems	  and	  Technologies	  in	  UK	  High	  
Street	  Banking	  1919-­‐1969‟	  Financial	  History	  Review	  14,	  no.	  2	  (2007):	  177-­‐205.	  
42	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  et	  al.	  “Building	  Bankomat”,	  op.	  cit.	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reached	  influential	  positions	  within	  the	  savings	  banks.	  In	  Spain,	  it	  was	  middle	  managers	  of	  savings	  banks	  
who	  regularly	  staff	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  “Commission	  of	  Operations	  and	  Automation”	  (known	  as	  COAS	  by	  
its	  Spanish	  acronym).	  This	  was	  a	  committee	  based	  at	   their	  national	  association	   (known	  as	  CECA	  by	   its	  
Spanish	  acronym)	  and	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  computerization	  of	  Spanish	  savings	  banks.43	  
Inspired	  by	  this	  vision,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  to	  leap	  ahead	  of	  their	  competition,	  several	  banks	  in	  the	  
late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  conducted	  cashless-­‐checkless	  “pilot	  projects”	  to	  determine	  whether	  such	  a	  
system	  would	  be	  technically	  and	  socially	  feasible.	  The	  Bank	  of	  Delaware	  in	  Wilmington	  conducted	  what	  
may	  be	  the	  first	  such	  test	  in	  1967,	  “enabling	  retailers	  to	  receive	  instant	  payment	  for	  merchandise	  at	  the	  
bank	   via	   their	   customers’	  machine-­‐readable	   identification	   cards.”44	   In	   1971,	   the	   President	   of	   the	   City	  
National	  Bank	  and	  Trust	   (CNBT)	  of	  Columbus,	  Ohio	  noted	  that	   its	  “electronic	   funds	  transfer	  pilot	   test”	  
was	  intended	  to	  “peek	  into	  the	  future	  and	  learn	  the	  sequence	  of	  social	  and	  technological	  developments	  
that	   will	   bring	   about	   a	   society	   where	   most	   sales	   involve	   the	   electronic	   transfer	   of	   data	   and	   funds,	  
instead	  of	  cash	  and	  checks.”45	  These	  types	  of	  tests	  were	  well-­‐covered	  in	  the	  banking	  trade	  press,	  which	  
helped	  to	  legitimize	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	  amongst	  American	  bankers.	  
Bankers	   were	   also	   quick	   to	   see	   a	   potential	   connection	   between	   the	  machine-­‐readable	   cards	   used	   in	  
these	   pilot	   projects	   and	   the	   rapid	   spread	   of	   new	   bank-­‐issued	   credit	   cards	   under	   the	   new	   Interbank	  
association	  and	  BankAmericard	  licensing	  system	  (i.e.	  the	  genesis	  of	  VISA),	  both	  of	  which	  began	  in	  1966,	  
just	  as	  the	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	  vision	  was	  winning	  acceptance.	  Surveys	  from	  the	  time	  also	  indicate	  
that	  at	   least	  70	  percent	  of	  bankers	  believed	  that	  credit	  cards	  were	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  cashless-­‐
checkless	  society,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  entering	  that	  business	  in	  order	  to	  be	  prepared	  for	  what	  they	  saw	  
as	  an	  inevitable	  future.46	  
This	  vision	  of	  a	  cashless	  society	  spread	  with	  equal	  speed	  beyond	  the	  community	  of	  banking	  technology	  
enthusiasts	  and	  into	  broader	  communities.	  In	  his	  1968	  book	  2001	  (developed	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  film),	  
Arthur	  C.	  Clarke	  depicted	  a	  telephone	  call	  placed	  from	  space	  thus:	  “Floyd,	  after	  checking	  that	  the	  Area	  
Code	  for	  the	  United	  States	  was	  still	  81,	  punched	  his	  twelve-­‐digit	  home	  number,	  dropped	  his	  plastic	  all-­‐
purpose	  credit	  card	  in	  the	  pay	  slot,	  and	  was	  through	  in	  thirty	  seconds.”	  (p.51)47	  Two	  years	  later	  the	  book	  
Tomorrow’s	  World	  (based	  on	  a	  British	  television	  series	  profiling	  new	  inventions)	  included	  as	  an	  appendix	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  and	  Maixé-­‐Altés	  “Managing	  Technological	  Change	  by	  Committee”,	  op.	  cit.	  
44	  Kramer	  &	  Livingston:	  146.	  
45	  C	  Gordon	  Jelliffe,	  quoted	  in	  Payment	  Systems	  Newsletter	  (July	  1971):	  6.	  
46	  David	  Stearns,	  Electronic	  Value	  Exchange:	  Origins	  of	  the	  VISA	  Electronic	  Payment	  System	  (London:	  Springer,	  
2011);	  The	  Diebold	  Group,	  “Summary	  Report	  of	  a	  Survey	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Electronic	  on	  Money	  and	  Credit”	  (1967).	  
47	  Clarke,	  Arthur	  C.	  2001:	  A	  Space	  Odyssey.	  New	  York:	  New	  American	  Library,	  1968.	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drawn	  from	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  “futurology”	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  timeline	  of	  the	  near	  future.	  
Most	  entries	  now	  appear	  ludicrously	  optimistic	  (a	  Soviet	  Mars	  landing	  in	  1988;	  fusion	  power	  in	  1996;	  a	  
polar	   ice	   city	   with	   a	   population	   of	   500,000	   by	   1988).	   In	   contrast	   the	   entries	   concerning	   information	  
technology	   reflect	   technological	   goals	   that	  were	   largely	  met,	   even	   if	   the	   authors	   underestimated	   the	  
ability	  of	  old	  and	  new	  to	  coexist.	  Computer	  terminals	  were	  to	  enter	  the	  home	  by	  1980,	  the	  last	  national	  
newspaper	  would	  close	  down	   in	  1990,	  a	  “world	  computer-­‐information	  bank”	  was	   to	  be	  established	   in	  
1994,	  and	   in	  2008	  the	  “Bank	  of	  England	  withdraws	  cash	  and	  notes	   in	  favor	  of	  credit-­‐card	  economy.”48	  
The	  show	  itself	  had	  featured	  a	  lengthy	  imagined	  depiction	  of	  this	  cashless	  future,	  bolstered	  with	  models	  
of	  an	  ambitious	  real-­‐time	  banking	  system	  under	  development	  by	  Barclays	  Bank.49	  
Within	  a	  five	  year	  period	  from	  1965	  to	  1970	  the	  checkless-­‐cashless	  future	  had	  passed	  from	  a	  somewhat	  
marginal	   speculation	   to	   a	   taken	   for	   granted	   part	   of	   the	   industry’s	   conventional	   wisdom.	   No	   such	  
payment	  system	  was	  in	  commercial	  operation,	  or	  had	  been	  proven	  in	  a	  pilot	  study	  of	  more	  than	  trivial	  
scope.	   In	  fact	  the	  technology	  to	  realize	  the	  vision	  did	  not	  yet	  exist,	  as	  a	  series	  of	  failed	  projects	   in	  the	  
financial	   industry	   during	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s	   would	   demonstrate.50	   Nevertheless	   trade	  
associations,	   technology	   suppliers,	   leading	   banks,	   industry	   commentators	   and	   consultants	   had	   all	  
endorsed	  it	  as	  not	  just	  desirable	  but	  inevitable.	  In	  the	  language	  of	  the	  new	  institutionalism,	  a	  new	  and	  in	  
some	   respects	   quite	   different	   kind	   of	   bank	   (with	   some	   core	   operational	   activities	   deleted	   and	   others	  
added)	   had	   been	   successfully	   institutionalized	   within	   this	   organizational	   field	   as	   the	   future	  
organizational	  form.	  Any	  bank	  that	  failed	  to	  endorse	  the	  new	  consensus	  would	  sacrifice	  legitimacy	  and	  
be	  seen	  as	  conservative	  and	  marginal.	  Any	  ambitious	  young	  banker	  would	  be	  well	  advised	  to	  cast	  his	  (or	  
occasionally	  her)	  lot	  in	  with	  the	  new	  order.	  	  
Conflicting	  Definitions	  of	  the	  Cashless-­‐Checkless	  Society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Baxter,	  Raymond,	  and	  James	  Burke.	  Tomorrow's	  World.	  London:	  British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  1970.	  
49	  The	  Tomorrow’s	  World	  segment”New	  Banking”	  was	  broadcast	  on	  December	  9,	  1969	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  at	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccqYKoLbT3I.	  The	  Barclays	  project	  is	  discussed	  in	  Ian	  Martin	  (2010)	  ‘”Too	  Far	  
Ahead	  of	  its	  Time”:	  Britain,	  Burroughs	  and	  Real-­‐Time	  Banking	  in	  the	  1960s”,	  Society	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Technology	  
Annual	  Conference;	  Ian	  Martin,	  “Britain’s	  First	  Computer	  Centre	  for	  Banking:	  What	  did	  this	  Building	  Do?”	  in	  	  
Technological	  Innovation	  in	  Retail	  Finance:	  International	  Historical	  Perspectives,	  Bernardo	  Bátiz-­‐Lazo,	  J.	  Carles	  
Maixé-­‐Altés	  and	  Paul	  Thomes	  (eds.)(Routledge,	  2010),	  37-­‐70.	  
50	  In	  the	  early	  1970s	  the	  merger	  of	  cash	  dispensers	  and	  computing	  technology	  was	  yet	  to	  happen	  but	  when	  it	  did	  
“it	  will	  also	  be	  technologically	  possible	  to	  bring	  in	  the	  same	  system	  many	  of	  an	  individual's	  purchases	  and	  other	  
money	  transactions	  so	  the	  much	  discussed	  concept	  of	  immediate,	  electronic	  transfer	  could	  well	  take	  off	  at	  the	  
time.”	  	  Kenneth	  Owen	  	  (1971)	  "Bank	  technology:	  Its	  an	  all-­‐computed	  cash	  dispensing	  world",	  The	  Times,	  Nov	  5	  
1971,	  p.	  23,	  Col	  A. 
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Consensus	  within	  the	  banking	  industry	  was	  established	  around	  this	  negative	  vision	  of	  the	  elimination	  of	  
cash	   and	   checks,	   rather	   than	   being	   framed	   as	   a	   positive	   alternative	   such	   as	   “the	   electronic	   payment	  
society”	  or	  “the	  credit	  card	  society.”	  This	  is	  not	  coincidental.	  There	  was	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  support	  for	  
the	   idea	  of	  eliminating	  cash	  and	  checks	   than	   for	   replacing	   them	  with	  any	  particular	  alternative,	  giving	  
the	  term	  what	  sociologists	  of	  science	  like	  to	  call	  “interpretative	  flexibility.”	  Yet	  this	  flexibility	  could	  only	  
be	   retained	   for	   a	   limited	   period.	   By	   the	   early	   1970s,	   the	   expectation	   of	   a	   coming	   cashless-­‐checkless	  
society	   was	   generally	   assumed,	   but	   as	   new	   actors	   and	   their	   organizations	   became	   involved	   in	   the	  
discussion,	  the	  details	  of	  how	  exactly	  this	  sort	  of	  a	  society	  might	  come	  to	  fruition	  became	  contested	  and	  
cloudier.	  Although	  futuristic	  visions	  can	  ultimately	  result	  in	  mimetic	  isomorphism,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  
realize	  that	  during	  the	  formation	  of	  these	  visions,	  various	  actors	  will	  struggle	  to	  define	  the	  particulars	  of	  
that	  vision	  in	  terms	  that	  are	  most	  favorable	  to	  themselves.	  Actors	  that	  are	  most	  successful	  at	  enrolling	  
other	   actors	   into	   their	   particular	   definition	   of	   the	   vision	   tend	   to	   “win,”	   not	   only	   strengthening	   their	  
economic	  position	  in	  the	  industry,	  but	  also	  their	  ideological	  control	  over	  it.	  
In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  there	  were	  six	  primary	  actor	  groups	  vying	  for	  control	  over	  the	  structural	  details	  of	  the	  
cashless-­‐checkless	   society.	   The	   first	   was	   the	   Federal	   Reserve,	   with	   George	  Mitchell	   being	   their	   most	  
vocal	  representative.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  Fed	  wanted	  to	  remain	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  cashless-­‐checkless	  
society,	  and	  thus	  wanted	  to	  construct	  the	  electronic	  analog	  to	  their	  existing,	  centralized	  check	  clearing	  
services.	  	  
The	   large,	   technically-­‐advanced	   commercial	   banks	   formed	   the	   second	   group,	   and	   their	   position	   was	  
most	   clearly	   articulated	   by	   John	   Reed	   of	   Citibank.51	   Reed	   saw	   electronic	   payments	   as	   a	   competitive	  
weapon,	   something	   that	  would	   allow	   innovative	   banks	   like	   his	   to	   displace	   those	   that	  were	   slower	   to	  
adapt.	   Thus	  he	  advocated	   the	   competitive	  development	  of	  proprietary	  electronic	   funds	   transfer	   (EFT)	  
systems.	   This	   was	   the	   same	   model	   most	   banks	   were	   adopting	   for	   their	   budding	   automated	   teller	  
machine	  (ATM)	  networks,	  and	  Reed	  saw	  the	  point	  of	  sale	  as	   just	  another	  kind	  of	  cash	  machine.	  Other	  
banks	  could	  gain	  access	  to	  Citibank’s	  EFT	  system,	  but	  only	  for	  a	  fee,	  and	  only	  on	  Citibank’s	  terms.	  
The	  smaller,	   less	  technically-­‐savvy	  banks	  formed	  the	  third	  group,	  and	  their	  position	  was	  articulated	  by	  
James	  E	  Brown	  of	  Mercantile	  Trust	  Company	  of	  St	  Louis.52	  Concerned	  that	  the	  larger	  commercial	  banks	  
would	  use	  their	  technical	  expertise	  to	  consolidate	  the	  banking	  industry.	  He	  favored	  the	  development	  of	  
a	   shared	   EFT	   infrastructure	   managed	   either	   by	   the	   Fed	   or	   by	   regional	   associations.	   He	   argued	   that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  John	  Reed,	  “The	  Case	  for	  Own-­‐Your-­‐Own,”	  Banking	  (Oct	  1972):	  20.	  
52	  James	  E	  Brown,	  “The	  Case	  for	  Shared	  Terminals,”	  Banking	  (Oct	  1972):	  20	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point-­‐of-­‐sale	  terminal	  networks	  were	  more	  akin	  to	  mailboxes	  or	  telephone	  lines	  than	  ATMs,	  there	  being	  
no	   value	   to	   consumer	   or	   merchant	   in	   having	   multiple	   incompatible	   terminals	   and	   cards.	   Brown’s	  
concerns	  were	  also	  motivated	  by	   the	  very	   real	  possibility	   that	   the	  Citibanks	  of	   the	  nation	  could	  easily	  
turn	  the	  smaller	  banks	  into	  tenant	  farmers.	  
The	  fourth	  group	  consisted	  of	  the	  credit	  unions,	  savings	  &	  loans,	  and	  mutual	  savings	  banks,	  collectively	  
known	  as	  the	  “thrifts.”	  Their	  position	  was	  articulated	  by	  Norman	  Strunk,	  Executive	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  
League	  of	  Savings	  Associations.53	  Because	  they	  were	  originally	  chartered	  to	  promote	  consumer	  saving,	  
the	  thrifts	  could	  not	  issue	  checks;	  customers	  were	  required	  to	  visit	  their	  branch	  in	  person	  and	  withdraw	  
cash.54	  A	   cashless-­‐checkless	   society	  promised	   them	  new	  service	  options,	  provided	  of	   course	   that	   they	  
were	  not	  barred	  from	  participating.	  The	  thrifts	  favored	  a	  shared	  system	  run	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  as	  
they	   felt	   that	   this	   gave	   them	   the	   best	   chance	   of	   having	   access	   to	   whatever	   EFT	   system	   would	   be	  
developed.55	  
The	  fifth	  group	  consisted	  of	  the	  large	  national	  and	  regional	  retailers.	  In	  many	  ways,	  large	  retailers	  such	  
as	   Sears	  and	  Wards	  were	   in	  a	  better	  position	   to	  offer	   a	  nationwide	  EFT	   system	   than	   the	  banks	  were:	  
they	  issued	  more	  credit	  cards	  than	  all	  the	  banks	  combined;	  they	  had	  “branches”	  throughout	  the	  country	  
that	   were	   open	   late	   and	   on	   weekends;	   they	   had	   an	   extensive	   network	   of	   electronic	   cash	   registers	  
capable	   of	  making	   electronic	   deposits	   and	  withdrawals	   from	   cardholder	   accounts;	   and	  many	   already	  
cashed	  payroll	  checks	   for	  their	  working-­‐class	  customers.	  The	  retailers	  were	  typically	  not	   invited	  to	  the	  
various	  banking	  industry	  discussions	  about	  the	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society,	  sparking	  Gordon	  Worley,	  the	  
Vice	  President	  of	  Finance	  for	  Montgomery	  Wards,	  to	  warn	  the	  bankers	  not	  to	  ignore	  them:	  “I	  think	  the	  
banks	  should	  co-­‐operate	  with	  us	  on	   this	  because,	   if	   they	   force	  us	   to	  go	  our	  own	  way,	   they	  could	   find	  
themselves	  locked	  out.”56	  
The	   national	   credit	   card	   associations	   made	   up	   the	   sixth	   and	   final	   group,	   and	   their	   most	   vocal	   and	  
assertive	  spokesperson	  was	  Dee	  Hock,	  CEO	  of	  the	  organization	  that	  would	  soon	  be	  rebranded	  as	  VISA.57	  
Hock	   saw	   his	   own	   organization	   at	   the	   center	   of	   an	   international	   EFT	   system.	   He	   favored	   a	   shared	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  “When	  We	  Achieve	  a	  Nationwide	  Electronic	  Funds	  Transfer	  System,”	  Banking	  (May	  1974):	  29-­‐32+	  
54	  Several	  states	  began	  allowing	  the	  thrifts	  limited	  third-­‐party	  payment	  instruments	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  but	  this	  was	  
not	  universal.	  These	  accounts	  were	  known	  as	  Negotiable	  Order	  of	  Withdrawal,	  or	  NOW	  accounts.	  
55	  Strunk	  mentioned	  in	  the	  article	  that	  the	  thrifts	  had	  been	  barred	  initially	  from	  the	  new	  automated	  clearinghouse	  
in	  California,	  and	  were	  allowed	  access	  only	  after	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  their	  behalf.	  
56	  “Banking	  at	  the	  Chain	  Store—Closer	  Than	  You	  Think,”	  US	  News	  and	  World	  Report	  (16	  Sept	  1974):	  77	  
57	  The	  organization	  was	  named	  National	  BankAmericard	  Incorporated	  until	  1977.	  Technically,	  VISA	  is	  a	  recursive	  
acronym	  for	  Visa	  International	  Services	  Association,	  but	  it	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  “Visa”	  after	  first	  use.	  
For	  a	  history	  of	  Visa’s	  origins,	  see	  Stearns,	  Electronic	  Value	  Exchange.	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cooperative	  system	  that	  would	  give	  as	  much	  access	  to	  small	  rural	  banks	  as	  it	  did	  to	  large	  money-­‐center	  
ones.	  But	  he	  also	   favored	   the	  development	  of	   several	  of	   these	   types	  of	  cooperative	  systems,	  creating	  
competition	  at	  the	  system	  level	  so	  that	  there	  would	  still	  be	  an	  incentive	  for	  innovation.	  
Visa	  and	  the	  Cashless-­‐Cashless	  Society	  
As	  a	  mid-­‐level	  manager	  in	  a	  Seattle-­‐area	  bank	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  Hock	  had	  become	  enamored	  with	  the	  
possibility	  of	  what	  he	  would	  later	  term	  “electronic	  value	  exchange.”	  His	  ideas	  were	  no	  doubt	  influenced	  
by	   the	   cashless-­‐checkless	   society	   vision	   of	   the	   1960s,	   but	   he	   saw	   a	   potential	   that	  went	   far	   beyond	   a	  
simple	  electronic	  analog	  to	  the	  existing	  check	  clearing	  system.	  He	  envisioned	  an	  “asset	  card”	  that	  could	  
instantly	   access	   any	   pool	   of	   funds	   the	   cardholder	   might	   possess—deposits,	   lines	   of	   credit,	   liquid	  
investments,	  etc.—at	  any	  time	  of	  day	  and	  from	  any	  location	  in	  the	  developed	  world.	  Merchants	  would	  
happily	   accept	   it	   because	   payment	  would	   be	   guaranteed,	   just	   as	   bank-­‐issued	   credit	   card	   transactions	  
were.	  Cardholders	  would	  love	  it	  because	  they	  could	  have	  safe	  access	  to	  their	  funds	  whenever	  and	  from	  
wherever	  they	  happened	  to	  be.	  And	  the	  banks	  would	  eagerly	  embrace	   it	  because	   it	  would	  allow	  all	  of	  
them,	  even	  the	  small	  community	  banks,	  to	  offer	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  services	  to	  their	  customers.	  	  
It	   sounded	   like	   a	  win	   all	   around,	   and	   the	  organization	   launched	   its	   first	   product	  based	  on	   the	   idea	   in	  
1975,	   the	  Entrée	  debit	   card.	  This	   card	   looked	   similar	   to	   its	   credit	   card	   cousin,	  was	  accepted	   in	  all	   the	  
same	  places,	  and	  its	  transactions	  could	  be	  authorized	  and	  cleared	  electronically	  thanks	  to	  Visa’s	  recent	  
BASE	  I	  and	  II	  computer	  systems.	  Only	  a	  handful	  of	  banks,	   less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  Visa’s	  membership,	  
decided	   to	   issue	   it	   to	   their	   customers.	   This	   may	   seem	   surprising,	   as	   70	   percent	   of	   bankers	   polled	   a	  
decade	   earlier	   had	   believed	   that	   the	   national	   credit	   card	   networks	   were	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   the	  
cashless-­‐checkless	  society,	  and	  now	  Visa	  was	  offering	  them	  a	  functional,	  electronically-­‐processed	  debit	  
card	   with	   established,	   widespread	   acceptance.	   Although	   the	   Entrée	   card	   most	   certainly	   fit	   into	   the	  
general	  concept	  of	  the	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	  it	  clashed	  significantly	  with	  the	  detailed	  definitions	  of	  
that	  society	  being	  promoted	  by	  other,	  more-­‐powerful	  bankers.	  
The	   Entrée	   card	   clashed	   in	   two	   significant	   ways.	   First,	   it	   operated	   in	   a	   different	   way.	   The	   card	   was	  
designed	  to	  be	  accepted	  wherever	  the	  existing	  credit	  cards	  were	  accepted,	  which	  meant	  that	  it	  had	  to	  
be	   authenticated	  with	   a	   signature	   and	   not	   a	   personal	   identification	   number	   (PIN)	   or	   other	   biometric	  
test.	   Point	   of	   sale	   (POS)	   terminals	   that	   allowed	   cardholder	   input	   were	   available	   from	   a	   few	  
manufacturers,	   but	   were	   very	   expensive	   and	   thus	   were	   not	   yet	   widely	   adopted	   by	   merchants.	  
Merchants	  could	  use	  a	  terminal	  (or	  the	  telephone)	  to	  authorize	  the	  transaction,	  but	  would	  still	  need	  to	  
deposit	   a	  paper	   sales	  draft	   at	   their	   bank,	  where	   it	  would	  be	   captured	  and	   cleared	  electronically.	   This	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would	  permit	  overdrafts,	   though	  no	  more	  so	   than	   the	  paper	  checks	   the	  card	  was	  designed	   to	   replace	  
and	  only	  until	   the	  electronic	   data-­‐capture	   terminals	  were	  widely	   adopted.	   Still,	   for	  many	  bankers	   the	  
cashless-­‐checkless	   society	   meant	   “no	   more	   overdrafts,”	   and	   they	   were	   unwilling	   to	   accept	   any	   EFT	  
solution	  that	  contradicted	  this.	  	  
Second,	   the	  Entrée	   card	  embedded	  a	  different	   set	  of	   assumptions	  about	   the	   competitive	   structure	  of	  
the	   industry.	   Larger	   banks	   tended	   to	   favor	   private,	   non-­‐shared	   EFT	   systems,	   but	   the	   Entrée	   card	  was	  
subject	   to	  same	  principle	  of	  universality	  as	  the	  credit	  card:	  every	  bank	  that	  participated	   in	  the	  system	  
must	  accept	  transactions	  for	  all	  cards.	  Even	  banks	  that	  favored	  a	  shared,	  cooperative	  solution	  might	  be	  
happy	  to	  accept	  transactions	  from	  out-­‐of-­‐town	  banks,	  but	  wanted	  to	  deny	  access,	  or	  at	   least	  charge	  a	  
fee,	  to	  their	  rivals	  down	  the	  street.	  Hock	  had	  crafted	  the	  operating	  regulations	  of	  his	  system	  to	  prohibit	  
these	   kinds	   of	   selective	   barriers.	   This	   kind	   of	   behavior	   had	   almost	   destroyed	   the	   BankAmericard	  
licensing	  system	  in	  1968,	  and	  his	  new	  organization	  was	  not	  going	  to	  make	  the	  same	  mistake	  less	  than	  a	  
decade	  later.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  primary	  differences,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  cultural	  divide	  in	  American	  banks	  at	  this	  
time	   that	  worked	   against	   the	   Entrée	   card’s	   acceptance.	   Bank	   credit	   cards	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   consumer	  
credit	   side	   of	   the	   banks,	   not	   the	   deposit	   side,	   and	   even	   though	   the	   credit	   cards	   often	   contributed	  
significant	  revenues	  to	  the	  banks	  bottom	  line,	  they	  were	  never	  considered	  to	  be	  “real	  banking.”	  Credit	  
card	  program	  managers	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  step	  above	  pawn	  brokers	  and	  loan	  sharks,	  and	  were	  
often	  physically	  located	  far	  away	  from	  the	  stately	  lobbies	  and	  commercial	  loan	  desks.	  The	  deposit	  side	  
tended	  to	  have	  the	  organizational	  power	  in	  any	  given	  bank,	  and	  thus	  it	  was	  the	  deposit	  side	  that	  defined	  
the	  bank’s	  EFT	  requirements	  and	  plans.	  These	  bankers	  imagined	  a	  cashless-­‐checkless	  society	  patterned	  
after	  ATMs	  rather	  than	  credit	  cards.	  
Visa	  debit	   cards	  would	  eventually	   succeed,	  but	   the	   initial	   failure	  of	   the	  Entrée	   initiative	  demonstrates	  
both	   the	   power	   and	   the	   limitation	   of	   the	   cashless-­‐checkless	   society	   vision	   in	   guiding	   the	   actual	  
institutional	  development	  of	  the	  industry.	  This	  vision	  established	  a	  consensus	  regarding	  certain	  aspects	  
of	  the	  future	  (clearly	  there	  would	  be	  no	  checks)	  while	  leaving	  flexibility	   in	  others.	   Innovators	  like	  Hock	  
could	  draw	  on	  the	  established	  vision	  to	  legitimate	  their	  own	  plans,	  but	  even	  an	  initiative	  closely	  aligned	  
with	   the	   established	   future	   vision	  would	  not	   succeed	  unless	   it	   reflected	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   sufficiently	  
powerful	  alliance	  of	  stakeholders.	  Going	  against	  the	  established	  future	  vision	  would	  likely	  mean	  failure,	  
but	  working	  within	  it	  did	  not	  guarantee	  success.	  
Conclusions	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Fifty	  years	  after	  it	  first	  emerged,	  the	  idea	  that	  clumsy	  and	  expensive-­‐to-­‐	  handle	  coins	  and	  notes	  could	  be	  
replaced	  by	  efficient	  electronic	  payments	  (initiated	  by	  various	  types	  of	  plastic	  cards,	  chip	  cards	  or	  more	  
recently,	  mobile	  phones)	  is	  still	  heralded	  as	  a	  tantalizing	  prospect	  for	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.58	  In	  some	  
countries	  the	  process	  is	  quite	  advanced.	  In	  the	  European	  Union,	  Iceland	  is	  the	  most	  cashless	  society	  as	  
measured	  by	  purchase	  value	  in	  shops,	  where	  only	  about	  9	  percent	  of	  the	  turnover	  is	  paid	  by	  cash.59	  In	  
Turkey	   telecom	   operators	   (Turkcell),	   banks,	   authorities	   and	   a	   private	   e-­‐identity	   service-­‐providing	  
company	  (E-­‐Güven)	  have	  agreed	  upon	  a	  common	  SIM-­‐based	  identification	  solution.	  As	  a	  result,	  Turkish	  
customers	  can	  use	   their	  mobile	  phone	   for	   secure	  connections	   to	  online	  banking,	  government	  services	  
etc.60	   The	   success	   of	  mobile	   banking	   solution	  M-­‐PESA	   in	   Kenya	   has	   been	   noted	   to	   provide	   important	  
insights	   into	   the	   functioning	   of	   payment	   systems	   that	   go	   beyond	   interoperability	   issues	   in	   the	  
interaction	   between	   financial	   services	   and	   telecoms.61	   In	   Hong	   Kong,	   major	   transport	   operators	  
launched	  in	  September	  1997	  a	  contactless	  card	  primarily	  for	  transport	  ticketing.	  In	  2011,	  the	  “Octopus”	  
card	  had	  over	  11	  million	  daily	  transactions	  of	  which	  about	  40	  percent	  were	  non-­‐transport,	  small	  value	  
payments	  such	  as	  vending	  machines	  or	  fast	  food	  restaurants.	  Indeed,	  in	  many	  countries	  to	  pay	  with	  cash	  
is	  to	  mark	  oneself	  a	  potential	  criminal	  or	  terrorist	  (so	  much	  so	  that	  large	  transactions	  must	  be	  reported	  
to	   the	   government).	   But	   the	   assumption	   remains	   that	   the	   growth	   in	   automated	   payment	   volumes	  
(direct	   debits,	   standing	   orders	   and	   customer	   credits)	   together	   with	   increasing	   use	   of	   plastic	   cards	  
(and/or	  mobile	  phones)	  will	   triumph	  as	  the	  premier	  payment	  method(s)	  and	  will	   substitute	   for	  checks	  
and	  cash.	  	  The	  discourse	  of	  banking	  technology	  is	  still	  written	  in	  the	  future	  tense.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Steve	  Worthington,	  “The	  Cashless	  Society”,	  International	  Journal	  of	  Retail	  &	  Distribution	  Management,	  1995,	  
vol.	  23:7,	  pp.	  31-­‐40.	  The	  popular	  press	  is	  full	  of	  references	  to	  idea	  of	  using	  smart	  cards	  or	  mobile	  phones	  to	  replace	  
cash	  payments.	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  for	  instance,	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  to	  a	  cashless	  world”	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7876154.stm	  	  (accessed	  June	  20,	  2011);	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  communication	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  (accessed	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  20,	  2011);	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  a	  cashless	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  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7894666.stm	  (accessed	  June	  20,	  2011).	  To	  
date	  there	  are	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  long-­‐term	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  a	  full	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  transition	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retail	  banking.	  For	  an	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  Bátiz-­‐Lazo	  and	  Douglas	  Wood	  “An	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  Appraisal	  of	  
Information	  Technology	  in	  Commercial	  Banking”.	  Electronic	  Markets	  12,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  1-­‐12;	  K.	  Garbade	  and	  W.	  
Silber.	  1978.	  “Technology,	  Communication	  and	  the	  Performance	  of	  Financial	  Markets:	  1840-­‐1970”.	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Finance	  33,	  no.	  3	  (1978):	  819-­‐32;	  J.	  M.	  Pennings	  and	  F.	  Harianto	  “The	  Diffusion	  of	  Technological	  Innovation	  in	  the	  
Commercial	  Banking	  Industry”	  Strategic	  Management	  Journal	  13,	  no.	  29	  (1992):	  29–46.	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  and	  Mobile	  Payments	  –	  Moving	  towards	  a	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  Society?”,	  BIS	  Review	  40	  (2008):	  1-­‐
5.	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  Michael	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  Banking	  and	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  Regulatory	  Lessons”,	  Frankfurt	  
School	  of	  Finance	  and	  Management	  (Working	  Paper	  166),	  Frankfurt	  (2011),	  
http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48654/1/664524133.pdf	  (accessed	  November	  18,	  2011).	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  world	  we	  live	  in	  is	  similar	  to,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  created	  by,	  the	  vision	  of	  
a	  checkless-­‐cashless	  society	  institutionalized	  within	  the	  banking	  industry	  during	  the	  1960s.	  Within	  banks,	  
computer	   technology	   has	   greatly	   reduced	   paper-­‐based	   transactions	   with	   human	   tellers	   and,	   more	  
recently,	  with	   automatic	   teller	  machines.	  Middle	   class	   Americans	   still	   have	   checkbooks	   and	   still	   carry	  
cash,	  but	  they	  reach	  for	  them	  far	  less	  frequently	  than	  before.	  Many	  grocery	  stores	  and	  small	  merchants	  
no	   longer	  welcome	  personal	   checks.	  Major	  purchases	  are	  almost	   invariably	   charged	   to	  debit	  or	   credit	  
cards,	   authenticated	  with	  either	   a	  PIN	  or	   a	   signature	  depending	  on	   the	   context	  of	  use,	   and	  most	   can	  
access	  a	   line	  of	  credit	   if	   there	  are	   insufficient	  deposits	  to	  cover	  the	  transaction.	  Small	  transactions	  are	  
increasingly	   processed	   the	   same	   way.	   Across	   the	   Atlantic,	   although	   all	   European	   Union	   countries	  
showed	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  e-­‐payments	  per	  inhabitant	  for	  the	  years	  2002-­‐2006	  the	  actual	  variations	  
between	  countries	  were	  very	  large.	  62	  The	  use	  of	  cash	  seems	  to	  be	  decreasing	  at	  only	  2	  or	  3	  percent	  a	  
year,	  implying	  a	  long	  period	  of	  coexistence	  of	  old	  and	  new	  payment	  mechanisms.	  Indeed,	  British	  banks	  
tried	   but,	   for	   a	   political	   decision,	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   stop	   the	   clearing	   of	   checks	   in	   2018.63	   Cash	  will	  
remain	  significant	  for	  many	  years,	  especially	  in	  the	  central	  and	  southern	  parts	  of	  Europe.	  	  
Business	   historians	   are	   already	  well	   aware	   that	   technology	   is	   not	   simply	   an	   economic	   input	   of	  which	  
firms	   can	   consume	   more	   or	   less.	   Neither	   is	   it	   a	   deterministic	   force,	   dictating	   a	   single	   optimal	  
organizational	  form	  for	  a	  given	  era.	  Arguments	  can	  be	  equally	  made	  that	  computer	  technology	  can	  lead	  
to	  highly	  decentralized	  or	  highly	   centralized	  business	   firms.	   Indeed,	   technology	   can	   support	  efforts	   to	  
achieve	   competitive	   advantage	   by	   larger	   or	   small	   firms.	   Historians	   must	   thus	   look	   more	   deeply	   to	  
explain	  why	  applications	  of	  computer	  technology	  seem	  to	  have	  had	  little	  effect	  between	  1960	  and	  1980	  
or	   indeed	  how	  they	  were	   instrumental	   in	  the	  resurgence	   in	  productivity	  since	  1995.64	  Companies	  with	  
the	  highest	  returns	  to	  their	  information	  technology	  investments	  did	  more	  than	  just	  buy	  technology;	  they	  
reshaped	  their	  existing	  capabilities	  and	  invested	  in	  organizational	  capital	  (i.e.	  incentive	  systems,	  training	  
and	  decentralized	  decision	  making)	  to	  create	  digital	  organizations.65	  	  
What	  is	  important,	  therefore,	  are	  the	  goals	  toward	  which	  organizations	  put	  the	  technology	  they	  adopt	  
and	  the	  assumptions	  within	  which	  they	   invest	   it.	   	  These	  are,	   in	  turn,	  driven	  by	  a	  consensus	  within	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Liikanen,	  “Electronic	  and	  Mobile	  Payments”.	  
63	  “Checks	  will	  not	  be	  scrapped	  after	  all,	  banks	  say”,	  BBC	  News	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-­‐14122129	  
(accessed	  03	  August	  2011).	  
64	  Brynjolsson	  and	  Saunders	  Wired	  for	  Innovation,	  pp.	  x-­‐xii.	  
65	  Idem.	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industry	  as	  to	  its	  future	  shape.66	  Mimetic	  isomorphism	  is	  at	  work	  not	  only	  when	  the	  actual	  innovations	  
of	   other	   organizations	   are	   copied	   but	   also	   when	   a	   shared	   vision	   of	   historical	   inevitability	   and	   of	   the	  
proper	  application	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  is	  accepted	  within	  an	  organizational	  field.	  	  
The	  vision	  itself	   is	  not	  deterministic,	  but	  functions	  as	  a	  legitimating	  resource	  on	  which	  historical	  actors	  
can	  draw.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   the	  cashless-­‐checkless	   society	  vision	  established	  a	  common	  end-­‐point	   for	  
bankers	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  but	  they	  disagreed	  vehemently	  about	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  route	  they	  
should	  take	  to	  get	  there.	  Different	  actors	  struggled	  to	  define	  what	  they	  thought	  was	  the	  proper	  route,	  
hoping	   to	   enroll	   others	   into	   their	   plans.	   Crucial	   steps	   in	   operationalizing	   and	   shaping	   the	   actual	  
application	  of	  information	  technology	  to	  realize	  this	  vision	  were	  taken	  by	  middle	  managers,	  confirming	  
their	   importance	   in	   the	   process	   of	   change	   not	   just	   inside	   individual	   firms	   but	   also	   within	   an	  
organizational	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
Thus	   we	   argue	   for	   business	   historians	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   explore	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   technological	  
expectations	   influence	   management	   discourse	   and	   in	   turn	   shape	   the	   institutional	   development	   of	  
business.	  We	  believe	  that	  shared	  visions	  of	  historical	   inevitability,	  of	   future	  oriented	  knowledge,	  were	  
often	   a	   crucial,	   and	   indeed	   neglected,	   factor	   in	   shaping	   the	   thoughts	   and	   actions	   of	   historical	   actors.	  
Acceptance	   of	   these	   visions	   took	   place	   not	   just	   individually	   but	   also	   collectively,	   by	   industries	   and	  
occupations.	   Once	   consensus	   on	   the	   future	   destination	   was	   reached	   a	   variety	   of	   specific	   systems	   or	  
approaches	  could	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  realizing	  this	  future	  goal,	  making	  the	  future	  a	  banner	  
around	  which	  a	  heterogeneous	  alliance	  of	  interests	  could	  gather.	  When	  technologies	  failed	  to	  perform	  
as	  expected	  this	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  bump	  in	  the	  road	  to	  the	  future,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  challenge	  
to	  the	  inevitability	  of	  eventually	  arriving	  at	  the	  agreed	  destination.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	   Although	   business	   historians	   have	   debated	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   third	   industrial	   revolution,	   with	   the	   notable	  
exception	  of	  Robert	  R.	  Locke	  and	  Katia	  E.	  Schöne	  (2004).	  The	  Entrepreneurial	  Shift:	  Americanization	   in	  European	  
High-­‐Technology	  Management	  Education.	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  this	  discussion	  has	  been	  limited	  
to	  the	  impact	  of	  applications	  information	  technology	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  centralization	  of	  business	  organizations	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  contest	  the	  continuity	  and	  longevity	  of	  the	  Chandlerenian	  model	  of	  the	  firm	  
